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Abstract: 
We consider the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are 
concerned with employees and suppliers as well as shareholders compared to shareholder-
oriented firms. Societies with stakeholder-oriented firms have higher prices, lower output, 
and can have greater firm value than shareholder-oriented societies. In some 
circumstances, firms may voluntarily choose to be stakeholder-oriented because this 
increases their value. Consumers that prefer to buy from stakeholder firms can also 
enforce a stakeholder society. With globalization entry by stakeholder firms is relatively 
more attractive than entry by shareholder firms for all societies. 
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In their classic survey of corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997; p. 738) outline
their focus in the following way: \Our perspective on corporate governance is a straightfor-
ward agency perspective, sometimes referred to as separation of ownership and control. We
want to know how investors get the managers to give them back their money." In the US
and UK and many other Anglo-Saxon countries there is wide agreement that this is what
corporate governance is about. The law is clear that shareholders are the owners of the ¯rm
and managers have a ¯duciary (i.e., very strong) duty to act in their interests, and most of
the academic literature on governance has taken this perspective (see, e.g., Becht, Bolton,
and RÄ oell, 2003, for a more recent survey).
However, moving beyond the cases of the US and UK, ¯rms' objectives depend very
much on the country being considered, and often deviate signi¯cantly from the paradigm
of shareholder value maximization. To provide one example, in Germany the legal system
is quite explicit that ¯rms do not have a sole duty to pursue the interests of shareholders.
The Germans have the system of co-determination, in which employees and shareholders in
large corporations have an equal number of seats on the supervisory board of the company,
so that the interests of both must be taken into account (see Rieckers and Spindler, 2004,
and Schmidt, 2004).
Germany is by no means the only country where the interests of parties other than
just shareholders have bearing on companies' policies, and we document di®erences across a
variety of countries in the next section. The common theme among these regimes, however,
can be seen from surveys of managers reported in Yoshimori (1995). Figure 1 shows the
choices of senior managers at a sample of major corporations in Japan, Germany, France,
the US, and the UK, between the following two alternatives:
(a) A company exists for the interest of all stakeholders (dark bar).
(b) Shareholder interest should be given the ¯rst priority (light bar).
In Japan the overwhelming response by 97% of those asked was that all stakeholders
1were important. Only 3% thought shareholders' interests should be put ¯rst. Germany and
France are more like Japan in that 83% and 78%, respectively, viewed the ¯rm as being
for all stakeholders. At the other end of the spectrum, managers in the US and UK, by
majorities of 76% and 71% respectively, stated that shareholders' interests should be given
priority.
The same survey also asked the managers what their priorities were with regard to
dividends and employee layo®s. They were asked to choose between the following speci¯c
alternatives:
(a) Executives should maintain dividend payments, even if they must lay o® a number
of employees (dark bar).
(b) Executives should maintain stable employment, even if they must reduce dividends
(light bar).
Figure 2 shows the results. There is again a sharp di®erence between Japan, Germany
and France and the US and UK, in that in the former countries it is stakeholders' interests
more generally - and in particular workers - that must be considered by ¯rms.
In this paper our aim is to develop a simple model of stakeholder governance in the
context of an imperfectly competitive product market where ¯rms are concerned about their
continuity. We start by considering a two-period duopoly model of di®erentiated products
with price competition. In the ¯rst period ¯rms are subject to a random shock to their costs
and if this shock is large enough they may be driven into bankruptcy. If both ¯rms survive
they repeat the competition in the second period. If only one survives that ¯rm becomes a
monopolist in the second period. In choosing their ¯rst period prices ¯rms take into account
the e®ects on ¯rst period pro¯ts as well as on the probability of surviving into the second
period.
We model stakeholder governance as ¯rms putting weight in their objective function on
the e®ects of bankruptcy on stakeholders other than shareholders. If ¯rms do not survive,
stakeholders face costs of searching for new opportunities. If ¯rms survive, stakeholders earn
2rents from their relationships with ¯rms. We show that when ¯rms put weight on stakeholders
other than shareholders, this concern leads to a softening of competition: ¯rms charge higher
prices and their probability of going bankrupt is reduced. Consequently, pro¯ts in the ¯rst
period as well as total ¯rm value can be increased. Thus a concern for other stakeholders
can actually bene¯t shareholders through its e®ect on ¯rm value. Of course, workers and
other suppliers are also better o® from the softening of competition. However, since prices
are higher not everybody is better o® and, in particular, consumers are worse o®.
The fact that ¯rm value can be increased by a concern for stakeholders raises the possibil-
ity that shareholders may actually want to put in place governance structures that commit
them to adopt a concern for other stakeholders. We show that, when ¯rms anticipate a
su±ciently large reaction from their rivals, ¯rms can improve their shareholders' welfare by
voluntarily choosing to take into account other stakeholders. We also show that, even in
circumstances where ¯rms may not voluntarily adopt a stakeholder orientation, such gover-
nance structures may nevertheless arise endogenously if consumers are more willing to buy
from ¯rms that care about stakeholders other than shareholders.1 Interestingly, this leads
to a situation of self-enforcing societies where consumers induce ¯rms to adopt stakeholder
concerns, and consequently increase the value to shareholders.
We extend our framework to analyze issues related to globalization, where it has become
commonplace for domestic ¯rms to compete with ¯rms from other countries. We show that
regardless of the governance structure domestically, incumbent ¯rms fare better with the
entry of a stakeholder-oriented ¯rm than with a shareholder-oriented ¯rm. This suggests
that ¯rms in countries that are stakeholder friendly have greater incentives to oppose the
entry of ¯rms with shareholder-oriented governance structures than vice-versa. Similarly,
the desire for governments to protect domestic ¯rms from foreign competition is likely to be
greatest for stakeholder economies facing potential entry by shareholder-oriented ¯rms.
1An alternative could be that ¯rms lobby to put in place government regulations requiring a more
stakeholder-friendly approach to governance. Such political economy considerations may help explain the
legal requirements of codetermination in Germany, among other countries. See Pagano and Volpin (2005)
for a broader discussion of the interaction between employment protection and the electoral system.
3Our paper is related to a number of strands of literature. Blinder (1993) models the
objective function of Japanese ¯rms as the weighted sum of shareholder pro¯ts and a function
of employee earnings. He shows this leads ¯rms to maximize revenue. In contrast, we put
the ¯rm-speci¯c costs and bene¯ts stakeholders receive in the objective function rather than
employee earnings. The stakeholders will earn their opportunity cost whether they have a
relationship with the ¯rm or not. We show that concern for stakeholders leads to a concern
for survival and this softens competition.
Bris and Brisley (2005) show that having lower investor protection for minority share-
holders changes the way in which ¯rms compete, leading to higher output and lower prices.
This makes consumers better o® and can improve social welfare. Sklivas (1987) shows that
in oligopolistic industries shareholders can choose managerial incentives to alter the way in
which ¯rms compete and shows that ¯rm value can be increased in this way. Fershtman
and Judd (1987) also consider the interaction between managerial incentives and competi-
tion in oligopolistic markets. They show that compensation contracts can optimally depend
on things other than pro¯ts such as sales. There is a large literature on how debt a®ects
competition starting with Brander and Lewis (1986). They show that debt acts as a pre-
commitment device and changes the way in which ¯rms compete (Allen, 2000, contains a
discussion of this literature). Our approach is similar in that stakeholder governance commits
the ¯rms to be less aggressive, but we abstract from any additional strategic considerations
introduced by debt ¯nancing and instead assume the ¯rm is purely equity ¯nanced.
Our focus is on the positive aspects of stakeholder governance, in particular on ¯rm value
and prices. There is also the welfare issue of whether it is socially optimal for ¯rms to pur-
sue shareholder interests as in the Anglo-Saxon countries or whether adopting a stakeholder
perspective can lead to a superior allocation of resources. We know from the fundamental
theorems of welfare economics that with perfect and complete markets, symmetric informa-
tion, and perfect competition the allocation is Pareto e±cient if ¯rms maximize the wealth of
shareholders. If any of these assumptions are violated then it is no longer clear that this ob-
4jective leads to e±ciency, and recent work by Allen and Gale (2000, Chapter 12) and Allen
(2005) argues that changing ¯rms' objective functions from just focusing on shareholder
wealth can correct for market failures. They give an example of an overlapping generations
model with young and old managers where requiring consensus as in Japanese ¯rms (see
Aoki, 1990) can lead to a Pareto superior allocation.
Tirole (2001) takes a more negative view of the desirability of adopting a stakeholder-
oriented objective for the ¯rm. He argues that there are no reliable measures of stakeholder
welfare, with no analogs to either accounting measures such as ¯rm pro¯ts or market-based
measures such as a ¯rm's stock price. If workers and other stakeholders have interests that
diverge from those of shareholders, the lack of such measures makes it extremely di±cult to
charge managers with anything other than the pure maximization of ¯rm value.
However, in practice, ¯rms in countries such as Germany where there is worker rep-
resentation on boards do pursue stakeholder interests. Our approach to modeling this is
that stakeholder ¯rms will be more concerned about continuing in business than shareholder
¯rms. In models with perfect competition or monopoly, workers and shareholders will in
general have divergent interests. However, when ¯rms compete strategically, shareholder
wealth is increased precisely through the commitment value of charging a manager to devi-
ate from pure value maximization. Along this dimension, therefore, shareholders' incentives
are aligned with those of workers, and a commitment to a broader set of stakeholders can
still be consistent with the ultimate objective of increasing shareholder value.
There is a large managerial literature on how stakeholder governance can be imple-
mented. For example, Blair (1995) has suggested that ¯rm-speci¯c investments by employees
and other stakeholders are crucial. She argues that these people should be given residual
claimant status along with shareholders. O'Sullivan (2000) stresses the importance of build-
ing organizations that are able to continuously innovate and ensuring all stakeholders are
involved in this process.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss how gov-
5ernance arrangements vary across countries, and provide some institutional details. Section
3 presents a model analyzing the case where ¯rms care about other stakeholders in addition
to shareholders. Section 4 focuses on the incentives of ¯rms to become stakeholder oriented
and the possibility of having self-enforcing stakeholder economies. Section 5 looks at glob-
alization where di®erent types of ¯rms start competing with each other. Section 6 considers
the robustness of our results; and ¯nally Section 7 concludes.
2 Governance Arrangements in Di®erent Countries
As discussed above, the system of co-determination in Germany provides a clear example of
a country where ¯rms' objectives encompass a broader set of stakeholders in the ¯rm than
merely those who own shares. However, Germany is by no means the only country with
such a system. Wymeersch (1998) documents several other countries that have some form
of co-determination. Austria has a system of co-determination similar to that in Germany.
The Netherlands has a system known as the structuurvennootschap that is applicable to all
larger companies except for those with an international group structure such as Royal Dutch
Shell and Unilever. Here the labor representation is indirect in that directors must have the
con¯dence of employees. Members of the supervisory board must take care of \the interest
of the company and its related enterprise" (Wymmeersch, 1998, p. 1144).
In Denmark, Sweden, and Luxembourg, there is employee representation on one-tier
boards. In Denmark, a third of the board is elected by employees (with a minimum of
two) in companies with more than 35 employees. In Sweden, companies with more than
25 employees must have two labor representatives appointed to the board, while companies
with more than 1,000 employees must have three. The rights and duties of these board
members are the same as all other board members. In Luxembourg, ¯rms with more than
1,000 employees and some ¯rms with a state connection have one third of the board elected
by the employees.
6The system in France is di®erent in that for ¯rms with more than ¯fty workers two
workers' representatives act as observers at board meetings. They do not have the right
to vote. More conventional co-determination systems exist for privatized public sector ¯rms
and can be introduced voluntarily by ¯rms. In Finland companies can also voluntarily adopt
employee representation on the board. More than 300 companies have reportedly done this
(Wymmeersch, 1998, p. 1141).
Another type of worker participation in decision making is on the \enterprise council."
These are concerned with employment conditions such as lay-o®s and plant closures. Com-
panies with at least 1,000 employees - of which there are 150 or more in two or more EU
countries - must have a \European Works Council."
In Japan, the situation is yet again di®erent from the US and UK. Managers do not have
a ¯duciary responsibility to shareholders. The legal obligation of directors is such that they
may be liable for gross negligence in the performance of their duties, including the duty to
supervise (Scott, 1998). In practice, it is widely accepted that they pursue the interests of a
wide variety of stakeholders. This is well illustrated by a report of the annual meeting of the
International Corporate Governance Network in Tokyo from the Financial Times of August
1, 2001.
Hiroshi Okuda, chairman of Toyota Motor Corporation and of the Japan Fed-
eration of Employers' Associations, told the assembled money managers that it
would be irresponsible to run Japanese companies primarily in the interests of
shareholders.
...Mr. Okuda made his point by telling guests what Japanese junior high school
textbooks say about corporate social responsibility. Under Japanese company
law, they explain, shareholders are the owners of the corporation. But if corpo-
rations are run exclusively in the interests of shareholders, the business will be
driven to pursue short-term pro¯t at the expense of employment and spending
on research and development.
7To be sustainable, children are told, corporations must nurture relationships with
stakeholders such as suppliers, employees and the local community. So whatever
the legal position, the textbooks declare, the corporation does not belong to its
owners.
...`In Japan's case,' said Mr. Okuda, `it is not enough to serve shareholders.'
It is readily seen that, while the speci¯cs of the systems of governance in each country vary
widely, they have as a common objective the inclusion of parties beyond shareholders into
¯rms' decision-making processes. In particular, in many countries workers play a prominent
role, being regarded as important stakeholders in the ¯rm. The analysis that follows focuses
on this aspect of what we term \stakeholder governance."
3 A Model of Stakeholder Governance
Consider ¯rst a simple one-period model where two ¯rms, i 2 fA;Bg, o®er di®erentiated
products and compete in prices. Each ¯rm i faces a demand curve given by
Di = A ¡ biipi + bijpj
for j 6= i, where pi and pj are the prices charged by ¯rm i and j respectively, and bii and bij
depend on consumers' preferences over the good sold by ¯rm i relative to that sold by ¯rm
j. We assume throughout that bii ¸ bij, so that ¯rm i's demand is at least as sensitive to
its own price as it is to the price charged by its competitor. Each ¯rm i chooses its price to
maximize pro¯t as given by
max
pi
¼i = max
pi
(pi ¡ c)Di(pi) = max
pi
(pi ¡ c)(A ¡ biipi + bijpj);
where the parameter c represents the marginal cost of producing one unit of output. We
assume that c is the same for both ¯rms. The ¯rst order condition for pro¯t maximization
8gives
(A ¡ biipi + bijpj) ¡ (pi ¡ c)bii = 0, (1)
which yields
pi =
A + bijpj + cbii
2bii
:
Given a similar expression for ¯rm j, we can solve for the equilibrium prices e pi to obtain:
e pi =
1
bii
µ
A +
2
3
cbii +
1
3
cbij
¶
:
We now introduce bankruptcy by adding a second period, identical to the ¯rst. However,
we also assume that ¯rm i is subject to a shock to its marginal costs in period 1, so that
ci = c+²i, where ²i is distributed according to the distribution function F(:). For tractability,
we assume that F is a symmetric distribution whose density function f is non-increasing in
the absolute value of the shock.2 Firm i can operate in period 2 only if its pro¯t in the ¯rst
period, ¼i1, is nonnegative or, equivalently, if the shock is not too large: ¼i1 ¸ 0 , ²i · pi1¡c.
Denoting by ¼M
2 the pro¯t that either ¯rm earns if it is the sole surviving ¯rm in period 2,
so that it is a monopolist, and by ¼D
2 the pro¯t obtained by each ¯rm if both ¯rms are still
active, ¯rm i's maximization problem becomes
max
pi1
¦i = E[¼i1] + Pr(²i · pi1 ¡ c)
£
(1 ¡ Pr(²j · pj1 ¡ c))¼
M
2 + Pr(²j · pj1 ¡ c)¼
D
2
¤
:
The ¯rst term represents the expected pro¯t in the ¯rst period, while the second term is the
pro¯t ¯rm i obtains in the second period, which can be either ¼M
2 when it is the only ¯rm
surviving, or ¼D
2 if both ¯rms are still active. Each term is multiplied by the probability
the competing ¯rm survives or not. The ¯rm can also fail, in which case it gets zero pro¯ts.
2Any symmetric bell-shaped distribution satis¯es this condition, as well as a uniform distribution over a
bounded support.
9Noting that Pr(²i · pi1 ¡ c) = F(pi1 ¡ c), the maximization problem can be written as
max
pi1
¦i = E[¼i1] + F(pi1 ¡ c)
£
(1 ¡ F(pj1 ¡ c))¼
M
2 + F(pj1 ¡ c)¼
D
2
¤
:
We assume throughout that
@2¦i
@pj1@pi1 ¸ 0, so that prices are strategic complements. This
condition can be expressed as
@2
i ¦i
@pj1@pi1
=
@2E[¼i1]
@pi1@pj1
¡ f(pi1 ¡ c)f(pj1 ¡ c)
¡
¼
M
2 ¡ ¼
D
2
¢
¸ 0:
Note that
@2E[¼i1]
@pi1@pj1 = bij > 0: The second term, however, is negative because the incentive
for ¯rm i to survive when ¯rm j does not survive introduces an element of strategic sub-
stitutability into the model. The condition therefore amounts to assuming that the e®ect
on ¯rst period pro¯ts of an increase in a competitor's price is greater than the reduction in
second period pro¯t when the competitor also survives.
We also assume the standard regularity condition (see Dixit, 1986) that
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
@2¦i
@pj1@pi1
@2¦i
@p2
i1
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
< 1,
which can be expressed as
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
@2¦i
@pj1@pi1
@2¦i
@p2
i1
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
=
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
bij ¡ f(pi1 ¡ c)f(pj1 ¡ c)
¡
¼M
2 ¡ ¼D
2
¢
bii +
@f(pi1¡c)
@pi1 ((1 ¡ F(pj1 ¡ c))¼M
2 + F(pj1 ¡ c)¼D
2 )
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
< 1 (2)
This condition implies well-behaved reaction functions for both ¯rms.
Letting b pi1 denote the equilibrium price for ¯rm i in the ¯rst period, we have the following
immediate result.
Proposition 1 The concern for survival into the second period leads to higher ¯rst period
prices than in the one-period model, i.e., b pi1 > e pi.
Proof: Di®erentiating ¯rm i's expected pro¯t with respect to pi1, we have
@¦i
@pi1
=
@E[¼i1]
@pi1
+ f(pi1 ¡ c)
¡
(1 ¡ F(pj1 ¡ c))¼
M
2 + F(pj1 ¡ c)¼
D
2
¢
= 0: (3)
10Since f(pi1 ¡ c) and
¡
(1 ¡ F(pj1 ¡ c))¼M
2 + F(pj1 ¡ c)¼D
2
¢
are both positive, and
@2E[¼i1]
@p2
i1 =
¡2bii < 0; the equilibrium price is higher than in the one-period case, as given by (1). The
proposition follows. ¤
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. The probability that a ¯rm survives until
period 2, Pr(²i · pi1 ¡ c), is increasing in the ¯rst-period price pi1. Thus, the concern for
survival softens competition and induces ¯rms to charge higher prices than in the one-period
model. As a consequence, each ¯rm also produces less output. Whether or not this brings
the ¯rms closer to the monopoly price, pM
i , depends on how strong the ¯rms' incentives to
survive until period 2 are. Denoting by ¾i the variance of the shock ²i to ¯rm i's marginal
costs, we can state the following:
Corollary 1 There exists a value of the shock variance, 0 < ¾i · 1, such that ¯rms' ¯rst
period equilibrium prices are lower than the price charged by a single-period monopolist ¯rm:
b pi1 < pM
i for ¾i < ¾i.
Proof: See appendix. ¤
When ¯rms care about surviving until period 2, they set prices to maximize their expected
pro¯ts across both periods. This means ¯rms balance out the maximization of ¯rst period
pro¯ts with minimizing the possibility of bankruptcy and thus increasing their chances of
survival. When survival is very uncertain because marginal costs are highly volatile, ¯rms
set higher prices to guarantee survival, potentially setting a price in the ¯rst period much
higher than the monopoly price. If the price chosen is too high, output can be reduced to
such an extent that pro¯ts are lower in the ¯rst period. When survival is not as uncertain,
¯rms set prices below the level chosen by a monopolist and they have higher ¯rst-period
pro¯ts relative to the case when they care only about the single period. In what follows, we
assume throughout that ¾i < ¾i.
We have assumed so far that ¯rms maximize their expected pro¯ts, taking into account
only shareholder value. We now introduce a concern for other stakeholders. If a ¯rm were
11to go bankrupt, its employees and suppliers would have to bear the costs of ¯nding new jobs
and customers. If the ¯rm is interested in stakeholders other than shareholders it will attach
some weight to these costs in its objective function. This modi¯es the objective function for
¯rm i as follows:
max
pi1
­i = ¦i ¡ (1 ¡ F(pi1 ¡ c))Ki (4)
= E[¼i1] + F(pi1 ¡ c)
¡
(1 ¡ F(pj1 ¡ c))¼
M
2 + F(pj1 ¡ c)¼
D
2
¢
¡ (1 ¡ F(pi1 ¡ c))Ki;
where for simplicity of notation, Ki combines the weighting the ¯rm puts on stakeholder
costs and the level of these costs.3 In addition to the costs stakeholders incur in bankruptcy,
they may also earn rents when the ¯rm stays solvent. We could represent the weight the
¯rm puts on these bene¯ts to stakeholders by an additional positive term ki in the objective
function, received only if the ¯rm survives across periods (i.e., with probability F(pi1 ¡ c)).
As we shall see in Section 6 below, such a term has a similar e®ect to that studied here. For
the moment we therefore focus on the formulation in (4).
An important issue concerns the way in which (4) is implemented. As discussed in
the introduction, in Germany codetermination requires that in large ¯rms workers have
representation on the supervisory board. This ensures that the organizational structure of
decision making is such that workers' representatives have an important say in the strategic
direction of the company. The objective function (4) is one way of capturing this. However,
codetermination is not the only way to build concern for stakeholders into the organizational
structure of the ¯rm. The French requirement that workers' representatives be able to attend
board meetings can change the way meetings are conducted. By requiring consensus in
decision making processes as in Japan (see Aoki, 1990) it may be possible to have the ¯rm
put a weight on employees' interests directly. Another way is to give managers a certain
3This speci¯cation also corresponds to the case where ¯rms explicitly internalize the negative externality
their failure imposes on other parties who depend on the ¯rm, such as employees. See Tirole (2006) for a
recent discussion of stakeholder governance along these lines.
12degree of freedom in decision making. Since managers' interests are aligned in many ways
with those of other employees and stakeholders in terms of the costs they incur if the ¯rm
goes bankrupt, this may be an e®ective way of implementing (4). O'Sullivan (2000) contains
a discussion of how organizational structure can be designed to alter decision-making within
the ¯rm.
With (4) as the objective function for ¯rms we have the following result.
Proposition 2 A concern for stakeholders leads ¯rms to set higher prices, i.e.,
@b pi1(Ki)
@Ki > 0.
Proof: Di®erentiating (4) with respect to pi1, we have
@E[¼i1]
@pi1
+ f(pi1 ¡ c)
¡
Ki + (1 ¡ F(pj1 ¡ c))¼
M
2 + F(pj1 ¡ c)¼
D
2
¢
= 0. (5)
Since the second term, f(pi1¡c)
¡
Ki + (1 ¡ F(pj1 ¡ c))¼M
2 + F(pj1 ¡ c)¼D
2
¢
, is positive and
increasing in Ki, the equilibrium price must be increasing in Ki (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990,
1994). ¤
Proposition 2 establishes that a concern for stakeholders serves to soften competition
by increasing prices and reducing quantity in the ¯rst period. An interesting implication
of this concern for stakeholders is that ¯rms' production in stakeholder societies is further
away from the e±ciency benchmark provided by the perfect competition paradigm. In other
words, the reduction in competition induced by ¯rms' concern for survival (Ki) leads to
greater markups over marginal cost, and thus lower output.
Whether or not ¯rms themselves bene¯t depends on the magnitude of their concern for
employees.
Corollary 2 There exists a value Ki such that, for Ki < Ki, ¯rms have higher ¯rst-period
expected pro¯ts when they care about stakeholders than when they maximize only shareholder
value, i.e., E[¼i1]jKi>0 > E[¼i1]jKi=0 for Ki < Ki and E[¼i1]jKi>0 < E[¼i1]jKi=0 otherwise.
13Proof: See appendix. ¤
The result in Corollary 2 shows that ¯rms may have higher expected pro¯ts in the ¯rst
period when they care about stakeholders. This occurs when the penalty Ki is not too high.
When Ki is very large, the concern for stakeholders induces ¯rms to increase prices so much
that their sales, and consequently their pro¯ts, are hurt.
The corollary also gives rise to a result concerning the ¯rm's overall market value. Since,
for Ki < Ki ¯rm i's pro¯ts are higher in the ¯rst period, and since its probability of surviving
into the second period is increased for any positive value of Ki, it is possible that for Ki < Ki
¯rm i's overall market value is increasing in Ki. The increase in the probability of surviving
is good in terms of the increase in pro¯ts obtained as a duopolist but may be bad in terms
of the reduction in pro¯ts as a monopolist because also ¯rm j has a higher probability of
survival. We summarize this in the following corollary.
Corollary 3 For Ki = K < K, in a symmetric equilibrium ¯rms will have higher overall
market value when they care about stakeholders than when they maximize only shareholder
value, i.e., ¦ijK>0 > ¦ijK=0 for K < K, if
(1 ¡ 2F)¼
M
2 + 2F¼
D
2 > 0:
Proof: When the equilibrium is symmetric, Ki = Kj = K and pi1 = pj1, which implies that
F(pi1 ¡ c) = F(pj1 ¡ c) = F. Pro¯ts can then be written as
¦i = E[¼i1] + F (1 ¡ F)¼
M
2 + F
2¼
D
2
The previous corollary establishes that F is increased by an increase in K: The derivative of
pro¯ts with respect to F:
@¦i
@F
= (1 ¡ 2F)¼
M
2 + 2F¼
D
2 :
This gives the condition above. ¤
14While clearly F(:) depends on pi1 and is therefore endogenous, the condition can never-
theless be satis¯ed if ¼M
2 = ¼D
2 : It will not be satis¯ed if ¼M
2 is su±ciently large relative to ¼D
2 .
The result thus illustrates that shareholders and stakeholders interests are not necessarily
opposed but rather can be aligned since the increase in pro¯ts bene¯ts the shareholders and
the increase in the probability of survival bene¯ts its other stakeholders.
One ¯nal important point to notice is that even if having ¯rms caring about stakeholders
can be bene¯cial for both shareholders and other stakeholders, it may not enhance total
welfare. The reason is that consumers are worse o® due to the higher prices stakeholder
¯rms charge and the consequent reduction in output.
4 Self-enforcing Stakeholder Societies
So far we have analyzed the e®ect of a concern for stakeholders on ¯rms' equilibrium prices,
quantities, and pro¯ts. In doing this we have exogenously speci¯ed ¯rms' objective functions,
taking as given that ¯rms care about stakeholders, either from convention or because of legal
requirements such as codetermination. We now analyze whether adopting such a concern
for employees and suppliers into the ¯rm's objective function would indeed arise as an equi-
librium result. That is, we endogenize the choice of Ki and consider whether ¯rms ¯nd it
optimal to adopt organizational structures that put weight on stakeholders and thus pre-
commit to act like a stakeholder ¯rm. While incorporating Ki into ¯rms' objective functions
clearly softens competition and may increase pro¯ts, it may not be an equilibrium for ¯rms
to do this. The reason is that, when ¯rm j cares about its stakeholders, it raises its price and
lowers its output. Firm i in that case may have an incentive to commit to being aggressive
by lowering its own price to capture a greater market share, which it achieves by choosing
an appropriate organizational structure that commits it not to care about stakeholders.
We analyze here two cases. First, we study whether, absent any other consideration, a
¯rm would naturally choose to assign some positive weight to its general stakeholders in its
15objective functions. Second, we consider how consumers' desires to transact with \socially
conscious" ¯rms can alter the incentives for ¯rms to become stakeholder oriented.
4.1 Firms' Optimal Objective Functions
We extend here the model to introduce a ¯rst stage where we allow ¯rms to choose Ki.
Assume that at time t = 0, each ¯rm chooses the weight Ki that it places on stakeholder
concerns as part of its objective function. Then, conditional on each ¯rm's date 0 choice of
Ki, at time t = 1 each ¯rm chooses a price to charge in the ¯rst period.
In order to precommit to the objective function chosen at the initial stage, ¯rms must
implement an appropriate decision making structure within the ¯rm. As discussed above,
putting workers' representatives on the board is one extreme way of doing this. Requiring
consensus or allowing managers more autonomy are other ways to precommit to pursue
broader objectives.
Solving the two-stage game by backward induction, for given Ki and Kj, ¯rm i's optimal
price at t = 1 is given by b pi1 (Ki;Kj), exactly as found in the previous section. At t = 0,
each ¯rm then maximizes the objective function re°ecting the market value of the ¯rm with
respect to Ki, after substituting in the equilibrium prices b pi1 (Ki;Kj), b pj1 (Kj;Ki). For ¯rm
i; the objective is:
max
Ki
b ¦i = E[¼i1(b pi1; b pj1)] + F(b pi1 ¡ c)
¡
(1 ¡ F(b pj1 ¡ c))¼
M
2 + F(b pj1 ¡ c)¼
D
2
¢
;
where b ¦i = ¦i(b pi1 (Ki;Kj); b pj1 (Ki;Kj)).4 In what follows, we focus on the symmetric case
where bii = bjj and bij = bji, and on the symmetric equilibrium in the choice of Ki.
Proposition 3 Both ¯rms voluntarily adopt a stakeholder approach to governance when the
4We assume throughout this section that, while the ¯rm may implement a decision-making structure that
explicitly incorporates a concern for workers, it still has as its objective the ex ante maximization of pro¯ts.
An alternative speci¯cation would be that ¯rms commit to bearing the costs of the externality their failure
imposes on other stakeholders, as discussed in Tirole (2006). This could be formalized by assuming that the
¯rm bears a cost of Ki in case of failure as speci¯ed in equation (4), which would be subtracted from the
objective function above. All results go through under this alternative speci¯cation.
16resulting marginal increase in expected pro¯ts is positive, i.e., Ki > 0 for
@¦i
@Ki
¯
¯
¯Ki=0
Kj=0
> 0.
Proof: In a symmetric equilibrium, ¯rms will choose a positive level of Ki if the marginal
e®ect of an increase in Ki on the overall pro¯t, evaluated at Ki = Kj = 0, is positive. This
derivative can be obtained by the envelope theorem as
@b ¦i
@Ki
=
@E[¼i1(b pi1; b pj1)]
@b pj1
@b pj1
@Ki
¡ F(b pi1 ¡ c)
µ
¡
¼
M
2 ¡ ¼
D
2
¢
f(b pj1 ¡ c)
@b pj1
@Ki
¶
¡ f(b pi1 ¡ c)Ki
@b pi1
@Ki
;
(6)
which we require to be positive when evaluated at Ki = Kj = 0.
The term
@b pj1
@Ki can be written as
@b pj1
@Ki =
@b pj1
@b pi1
@b pi1
@Ki > 0, since
@b pj1
@b pi1 > 0 given prices are
strategic complements and
@b pi1
@Ki > 0 from Proposition 2. The term
@E[¼i1(b pi1;b pj1)]
@b pj1 is clearly
positive. The last term is just zero for Ki = 0. Thus, the ¯rst term in (6) is positive while
the second is negative so that if
@E[¼i1(b pi1;b pj1)]
@b pj1 is su±ciently large, a positive level of Ki will
be optimal. ¤
This result establishes that ¯rms ¯nd it optimal to design organizational structures that
put weight on stakeholders in the decisionmaking process when the strategic response of
their competitors is su±ciently bene¯cial. To understand this better, recall that an increase
in Ki makes ¯rm i less aggressive and raises ¯rm i's price. This, however, also causes ¯rm
j to raise its own price. The net e®ect for ¯rm i of ¯rm j's price increase is ambiguous
since it increases the likelihood that ¯rm j will also survive into the second period, thus
reducing the chance that ¯rm i earns monopolistic pro¯ts. Thus, only when ¯rm j's price
increase has a su±ciently large e®ect on ¯rm i's ¯rst period pro¯ts to compensate ¯rm i for
its reduced chance of being a monopolist will ¯rm i have an incentive to adopt a stakeholder
concern by setting Ki > 0. By contrast, when this e®ect is smaller, ¯rms do not choose to
care about stakeholders in equilibrium, despite the fact that doing so would allow them to
soften competition. It bears noting, therefore, that absent other constraints on ¯rm behavior,
there is no guarantee that ¯rms will choose to be concerned about stakeholders even if such
a concern would raise each ¯rm's price and pro¯t.
17Firms' incentives to adopt a stakeholder approach to governance depend on the degree
of competition in the ¯rst period as expressed by the size of the parameters bii and bij
representing the sensitivity of the demand of ¯rm i to its own price and the price charged
by ¯rm j. They also depend on the incentives to survive until period 2 as captured by the
probability of survival F(b pi1 ¡ c) and the pro¯ts ¼M
2 or ¼D
2 obtained. Note that there is
always a value of ± > 0 such that, for ¼M
2 ¡¼D
2 · ±, Proposition 3 will be satis¯ed. To show
that there are other cases where the condition in Proposition 3 is satis¯ed and ¯rms adopt
a concern for stakeholders, we provide an example. In particular, we assume that the shock
"i is distributed according to a uniform distribution on [¡1=2;+1=2] so that f(b pi1 ¡ c) = 1:
For simplicity, we also assume that consumers have the same sensitivity to changes in the
price of goods sold by ¯rms i and j so that bii = bjj = bij = bji = b: In this case Proposition
3 is satis¯ed when
b > (¼
M
2 ¡ ¼
D
2 )
A + ¼M
2
A + ¼D
2
:
Clearly, this is always satis¯ed when ¯rms do not bene¯t from being monopolists in period
2 so that ¼M
2 = ¼D
2 . Note also that in this example strategic complementarity requires
b > (¼
M
2 ¡ ¼
D
2 ):
This is a weaker condition since
A+¼M
2
A+¼D
2 > 1.
4.2 Social Norms in Stakeholder Societies
When the conditions of Proposition 3 are not satis¯ed, it is not worthwhile for ¯rms to choose
to adopt a concern for stakeholders because of the direct e®ects on strategic interaction. Even
when this is the case, however, there may be \social norms" or \social concerns" that induce
¯rms to become more stakeholder-oriented. To study this issue further and to capture one
aspect of what may be meant by a \stakeholder society," we here suppose that customers
care directly about ¯rms' social concerns, and have a preference for buying from such ¯rms.
18Speci¯cally, assume that customers prefer to purchase from ¯rms that commit to care not
only about shareholder value, but also about their other stakeholders. This implies that if
¯rm i cares relatively more about its employees and other stakeholders than ¯rm j, then
its demand will be less sensitive to changes in its own price: if ¯rm i's demand in the ¯rst
period is
Di1 = A ¡ biipi1 + bijpj1;
then bii < bjj whenever Ki > Kj.
One simple way of incorporating this kind of preference by customers is to assume that
bii = G(Ki;Kj), with @G
@Ki < 0 and @G
@Kj > 0. This means that ¯rm i's demand becomes less
sensitive to pi1 as ¯rm i increases its concern for stakeholders, and more sensitive to pi1 as
¯rm j increases such concern. Note that we make no assumption on whether overall demand
will increase, but rather only that the share of the market that any given ¯rm can obtain
by incorporating Ki into its objective function may vary. Indeed, it could well be that if
both ¯rms care about stakeholders equally, then there is no e®ect on the demand they face.
Formally, this can be implemented by assuming that G(Ki;Kj) = G whenever Ki = Kj.
With this in mind, we can now solve the same maximization problem as before with
respect to Ki as follows:
max
Ki
b ¦i = E[¼i1(b pi1; b pj1;Ki)] + F(b pi1 ¡ c)((1 ¡ F(b pj1 ¡ c))¼
M
2 + F(b pj1 ¡ c)¼
D
2 );
where again b ¦i = ¦i(b pi1; b pj1). We now obtain the following.
Proposition 4 When customers' demand is su±ciently responsive to ¯rms' concern for
stakeholders, ¯rms always choose to adopt a stakeholder approach to governance, i.e., for
¯
¯
¯
@G
@Ki
¯
¯
¯ su±ciently large, K¤
i > 0. Moreover, K¤
i is increasing in
¯
¯
¯
@G
@Ki
¯
¯
¯.
Proof: The derivative of the ¯rm's pro¯t, b ¦i, with respect to Ki, is given by
@E[¼i1(:)]
@Ki
+
@E[¼i1(:)]
@b pj1
@b pj1
@Ki
¡F(b pi1¡c)
µ
¡
¼
M
2 ¡ ¼
D
2
¢
f(b pj1 ¡ c)
@b pj1
@Ki
¶
¡f(b pi1¡c)Ki
@b pi1
@Ki
: (7)
19Note that there is an additional leading term relative to the case where bii is constant, as
given by (6). This term is the direct e®ect of an increase in Ki on ¯rst period expected pro¯ts,
@E[¼i1(b pi1; b pj1;Ki)]=@Ki. This term is positive, as it represents the fact that, holding price
constant, an increase in Ki decreases bii, and thus raises the (out of equilibrium) demand for
¯rm i, raising ¯rm i's expected pro¯t. Moreover,
@E[¼i1(:)]
@Ki is greater in magnitude the larger
is @G
@Ki. We can now follow an argument similar to that in Proposition 3 and evaluate (7) at
Ki = 0 to obtain the result. ¤
The proposition establishes that for @G
@Ki large enough in absolute value, it will always be
the case that K¤
i > 0 in equilibrium. In other words, when customers are su±ciently socially
conscious, ¯rms adopt a governance policy that focuses more generally on stakeholders rather
than just shareholders. Moreover, the comparative statics result is that the more sensitive is
consumers' demand to increases in ¯rms' commitment to weighting stakeholders, the more
will ¯rms commit to providing this.
One conclusion that can be drawn from these cases is that stakeholder societies can be
self-reinforcing in a wide range of situations. The fact that social norms exist that lead
customers to prefer to do business with socially conscious ¯rms makes ¯rms want to be
socially conscious. Since every ¯rm does this, there need be no change in aggregate demand
and sales, but there is an increase in prices and possibly in ¯rms' pro¯ts as well. Firms thus
compete with each other by setting up their organizational structures so as to in essence
cooperate more. A result of the social concern by consumers, however, is that there is a
transfer from consumers to the ¯rms and the workers. An interesting side note is that since
output is reduced, the stakeholder society is also farther away from the e±ciency of perfect
competition, and this happens independently of whether ¯rms' pro¯ts end up higher or lower.
205 Globalization and Firm Objectives
So far we have considered the case where ¯rms operate in the same cultural or social en-
vironment and have analyzed the e®ects and the incentives for ¯rms to adopt stakeholder
concerns. We now consider a setting where ¯rms in their domestic market all operate in a
similar fashion, being all either purely shareholder oriented, or all having similar stakeholder
concerns, and they face the entry of an additional ¯rm with possibly di®erent objectives. We
have in mind a situation where a foreign ¯rm enters into a new market where the goals of
the domestic ¯rms may be di®erent from those of the foreign entrant. In particular, this de-
scribes the case where a stakeholder oriented market, such as Japan, for instance, faces entry
of a U.S. style ¯rm whose primary concern is to maximize shareholder value. Conversely, it
also captures situations where shareholder friendly markets face the entry of a ¯rm whose
objectives are to generate value for stakeholders more generally.
Suppose that there are N symmetric ¯rms with Ki = K ¸ 0 for i = 1;:::;N. These ¯rms
can all therefore be either purely shareholder oriented, or stakeholder oriented to the extent
given by K. There is an N + 1 ¯rm that enters, with KN+1 ¸ 0, so that the entrant ¯rm
can also be either shareholder or stakeholder oriented.
Since the N incumbent ¯rms are symmetric, we will restrict our analysis to equilibria
where these N ¯rms all behave symmetrically, although the N+1 ¯rm may behave di®erently.
De¯ne pN = pi1, which is just the ¯rst period price set by a representative ¯rm i = 1;:::;N.
We begin by characterizing the expected pro¯ts for ¯rm i. For ease of notation, de¯ne ¼n
2 as
the expected pro¯t for (a representative) ¯rm i when n ¯rms are active at time 2. Trivially,
we have that ¼n
2 > ¼
n+1
2 for n · N ¡ 1. Absent the entrant, N + 1st ¯rm, and focusing on
an equilibrium with symmetric prices, we can now write
¦i(N) = E[¼i1] ¡ (1 ¡ F(pi1 ¡ c))Ki
+F(pi1 ¡ c)
"
N¡1 X
j=0
µ
N ¡ 1
j
¶
F(p
N ¡ c)
j ¡
1 ¡ F(p
N ¡ c)
¢N¡1¡j
¼
j+1
2
#
;
21where pi1 = pN in equilibrium given the symmetry assumption.
Proposition 5 pN is increasing in KN+1.
Proof: With the entry of ¯rm N + 1, we can write ¯rm i's pro¯t, ¦i(N + 1), as
E[¼i1] ¡ (1 ¡ F(pi1 ¡ c))Ki
+F(pi1 ¡ c)
0
B
@
(1 ¡ F(pN+1;1 ¡ c))
hPN¡1
j=0
¡N¡1
j
¢
F(pN ¡ c)j ¡
1 ¡ F(pN ¡ c)
¢N¡1¡j ¼
j+1
2
i
+F(pN+1;1 ¡ c)
hPN¡1
j=0
¡N¡1
j
¢
F(pN ¡ c)j ¡
1 ¡ F(pN ¡ c)
¢N¡1¡j ¼
j+2
2
i
1
C
A:
Similarly, we can write the pro¯t for the entrant, ¦N+1, as
E[¼N+1;1] ¡ (1 ¡ F(pN+1;1 ¡ c))KN+1
+F(pN+1;1 ¡ c)
"
N X
j=0
µ
N
j
¶
F(p
N ¡ c)
j ¡
1 ¡ F(p
N ¡ c)
¢N¡j
¼
j+1
2
#
:
Note that the derivative of ¦N+1 with respect to pN+1;1 is
@E[¼N+1;1]
@pN+1;1
+f(pN+1;1¡c)
"
N X
j=0
µ
N
j
¶
F(p
N ¡ c)
j ¡
1 ¡ F(p
N ¡ c)
¢N¡j
¼
j+1
2
#
+f(pN+1;1¡c)KN+1:
Setting this equal to 0 characterizes the equilibrium price for ¯rm N + 1, b pN+1;1. Since the
last term, f(pN+1;1 ¡ c)KN+1, is clearly positive, we have that b pN+1;1 must be increasing in
KN+1. Since prices for all N +1 ¯rms are strategic complements, pN must also be increasing
in KN+1. ¤
Proposition 6 First period expected pro¯t for the incumbent ¯rms, E[¼i1], is increasing in
KN+1.
Proof: To show that E[¼i1] is increasing in KN+1, simply note that each ¯rm's pro¯t
increases when the price of all ¯rms, pi1, i = 1;:::;N + 1, increases. But Proposition 5
establishes that pN, as well as b pN+1;1, the price for the entrant ¯rm, are all increasing in
KN+1. ¤
22These two results together imply that, whether the incumbent ¯rms are purely share-
holder oriented or if they care at all about other stakeholders, when an additional ¯rm enters,
the resulting price will be higher the more stakeholder friendly is the entrant ¯rm. Similarly,
the incumbent ¯rms' pro¯ts will be higher the more stakeholder friendly is the entrant ¯rm.
Therefore, conditional on entry, incumbent ¯rms prefer that more stakeholder oriented ¯rms
enter. The °ipside, of course, is that stakeholder oriented ¯rms are most hurt by the entry
of a shareholder ¯rm relative to having another stakeholder ¯rm enter.
One implication of our ¯ndings is that ¯rms with a focus on the maximization of only
shareholder value are likely to encounter greater resistance when entering a new market
than would ¯rms that are more stakeholder friendly, since the entry of the former is more
detrimental to incumbent ¯rms. This resistance may come either directly from the existing
¯rms, or from government policies geared toward protecting domestic ¯rms from the threat
of foreign entry. Since the entry of a shareholder ¯rm reduces the pro¯tability of domestic
¯rms more than the entry of a stakeholder ¯rm, shareholder ¯rms may ¯nd it more di±cult
to enter. Moreover, this resistance is likely to be greatest in countries where stakeholder
governance is the norm, since the ¯rms in these countries are the ones most likely to be
a®ected by the entry of ¯rms with only a shareholder focus.
Our framework can also be used to understand an additional important aspect of glob-
alization, which is the acquisition of a domestic ¯rm by a foreign institution. For instance,
our analysis can be applied to situations where a ¯rm that maximizes only shareholder value
buys another ¯rm in a foreign market where ¯rms that care about stakeholders more gen-
erally operate. After the acquisition, the newly purchased ¯rm simply adopts the parent
company's governance structure. Similarly, it can also be useful for studying situations in
which, in a given country or market, a ¯rm tries to go against the current social and cultural
norms and operates only maximizing shareholder value.
To study this aspect of globalization, we now consider the case where both shareholder
and stakeholder ¯rms operate together, but keep the number of ¯rms constant - and equal
23to two for simplicity - assuming only that one ¯rm changes from one governance structure
to the other. Formally, assume that ¯rm i is a stakeholder ¯rm with Ki > 0, while ¯rm j
maximizes only shareholder value (i.e., Kj = 0). We can now state the following.
Proposition 7 The stakeholder ¯rm sets a higher price than the competing shareholder ¯rm,
i.e., b pi1 > b pj1.
Proof: The ¯rst order conditions are identical to (5). Condition (2) implies that, since ¯rm
i places more weight on surviving into the second period than ¯rm j, in equilibrium it will
also set a higher price (for details, see Dixit, 1986). ¤
The result in Proposition 7 states that the stakeholder ¯rm would charge a higher price
and, as a consequence, have a lower market share (i.e., lower quantity produced) than the
¯rm maximizing only shareholder value. From this, it follows that the stakeholder ¯rm loses
market share to the shareholder ¯rm who is solely concerned with maximizing shareholder
value and therefore is willing to o®er a lower price.
We can say something further by comparing the solution above to the situation prior to
the acquisition, in which Kj > 0. For this, we have:
Proposition 8 Stakeholder ¯rms set higher prices when competing with other stakeholder
¯rms than when competing with shareholder ¯rms: b pi1jKj>0 > b pi1jKj=0.
Proof: See appendix. ¤
The intuition behind these last results hinges once again on the e®ect of the concern for
stakeholders on ¯rms' incentives in setting prices. Given that ¯rms compete in strategic
complements, the stakeholder ¯rm \follows" its rival in setting a price lower than when its
rival was a stakeholder ¯rm. However, as stated in Proposition 7 above, the concern for
stakeholders prevents the stakeholder ¯rm from reducing its price to the level charged by the
shareholder ¯rm. Taken together, these results imply that the acquisition of a stakeholder
24¯rm by a shareholder ¯rm leads to lower overall prices. While this is likely as well to lead
to greater output, the domestic stakeholder ¯rm clearly loses market share to the foreign
acquirer.
6 Robustness
In this section we consider two checks on the robustness of our results. The ¯rst concerns
the way we model ¯rms' concern for stakeholders. The second considers the e®ect of having
quantity rather than price competition.
6.1 Alternative Concerns for Stakeholders
So far we have considered that ¯rms take account of stakeholder concerns by choosing an
organizational structure where stakeholders' interests are taken into account. Formally, we
have assumed that ¯rms weight the loss that stakeholders other than shareholders su®er in
case their ¯rms go bankrupt. We now consider another possible way of modelling stakehold-
ers' interests, as was brie°y mentioned in Section 3. Speci¯cally, we consider that employees,
suppliers and other stakeholders receive rents from the relationship with the ¯rm. We model
the ¯rm's concern for these stakeholders by adding the term F(pi1 ¡ c)ki to its pro¯t when
it stays solvent. With this modi¯cation ¯rm i's objective becomes
max
pi1
­i = ¦i(ki) + F(pi1 ¡ c)ki
= E[¼i1] + F(pi1 ¡ c)
¡
(1 ¡ F(pj1 ¡ c))¼
M
2 + F(pj1 ¡ c)¼
D
2
¢
+ F(pi1 ¡ c)ki.(8)
It is straightforward to see that this alternative way of modeling stakeholders' does not a®ect
¯rm i's pricing. As in the basic model, the concern for stakeholders leads ¯rms to increase
prices relative to those in the two-period model and to the same level as in Proposition 2.
Similarly for the other propositions.
256.2 Model of Quantity Competition
Consider a variant of the model above where ¯rms compete by choosing the quantity they
want to produce instead of the price at which to sell. Speci¯cally, ¯rm i's demand function
in period t is given by
Pit = A ¡ biiqit ¡ bijqjt
Expected pro¯ts in period t are then given by
¼it = (Pit ¡ ci)qit = (A ¡ biiqit ¡ bijqjt ¡ ci)qit
With two periods, we assume that each ¯rm is subject to a shock to its marginal cost in
period 1: ci = c+²i. Note that ¼i1 ¸ 0 , ²i · Pi1¡c, so that the probability this condition
is satis¯ed is just Pr(²i · Pi1 ¡ c) = F (Pi1 ¡ c).
The objective for ¯rm i is now to maximize ¦i ¡(1 ¡ F (Pi1 ¡ c))Ki with respect to qi1:
max
qi1
E[¼i1] + F (Pi1 ¡ c)
¡
(1 ¡ F (Pj1 ¡ c))¼
M
2 + F(Pj1 ¡ c)¼
D
2
¢
¡ (1 ¡ F (Pi1 ¡ c))Ki
The FOC is given by
@E[¼i1]
@qi1
+ f(Pi1 ¡ c)
@Pi1
@qi1
¡
Ki + (1 ¡ F(Pj1 ¡ c))¼
M
2 + F(Pj1 ¡ c)¼
D
2
¢
= 0
Note that, for the second term,
@Pi1
@qi1 < 0, but that all other terms are positive, implying
that the entire second term is negative. Moreover, the absolute value of this expression is
increasing in Ki, so that the equilibrium ¯rst period quantity choice, b qi1, will be decreasing
in Ki. As a result, the ¯rst period price, Pi1, will be increasing in Ki, thus con¯rming this
result from the model of price competition.
We next extend the model to allow ¯rms to choose Ki in similar fashion to Section 3.
Assume that at time t = 0 each ¯rm chooses Ki. Then, conditional on each ¯rm's choice
26of Ki, at time t = 1 each ¯rm chooses how much to produce in the ¯rst period. Solving
by backward induction, ¯rm i's optimal quantity choice at t = 1, for given Ki and Kj, is
b qi1 (Ki;Kj). At t = 0, each ¯rm then maximizes its overall pro¯ts with respect to Ki:
max
Ki
b ¦i = E[¼i1(b qi1; b qj1)] + F
³
b Pi1 ¡ c
´³³
1 ¡ F
³
b Pj1 ¡ c
´´
¼
M
2 + F(b Pj1 ¡ c)¼
D
2
´
where b ¦i = ¦i(b qi1; b qj1), and b Pi1 = Pi1(b qi1; b qj1). We focus again on the symmetric case where
bii = bjj and bij = bji, and on the symmetric equilibrium in the choice of Ki.
The derivative of expected pro¯ts with respect to Ki is given by
@^ ¦i
@Ki
=
@E[¼i1(b qi1; b qj1)]
@qj1
@b qj1
@Ki
+ f
³
b Pi1 ¡ c
´ @ b Pi1
@qj1
@b qj1
@Ki
³³
1 ¡ F
³
b Pj1 ¡ c
´´
¼
M
2 + F(b Pj1 ¡ c)¼
D
2
´
+F
³
b Pi1 ¡ c
´¡
¼
D
2 ¡ ¼
M
2
¢
f(b Pj1 ¡ c)
@ b Pj1
@qj1
@b qj1
@Ki
¡ f(b Pi1 ¡ c)Ki
@ b Pi1
@b qi1
@b qi1
@Ki
:
The term
@b qj1
@Ki can be written as
@b qj1
@Ki =
@b qj1
@qi1
@b qi1
@Ki > 0 since
@b qj1
@qi1 < 0 (strategic substitutes) and
@b qi1
@Ki < 0 from the discussion above. Since
@E[¼i1(:)]
@qj1 < 0, the ¯rst term is strictly negative. For
the rest, note that
@ b Pi1
@qj1,
@ b Pj1
@qj1 < 0 since a greater quantity by either ¯rm reduces the price
each ¯rm obtains. Since
@b qj1
@Ki > 0, this implies that all remaining terms are also negative,
so that
@b ¦i
@Ki < 0 for all Ki > 0. We have therefore established that when ¯rms compete
in their choice of quantities to produce, no ¯rm would voluntarily choose a positive Ki in
equilibrium, despite the fact that doing so would raise both ¯rms' pro¯ts.
As a ¯nal point, we analyze the case where a social norm exists that induces ¯rms
to become more stakeholder-oriented. We incorporate this by assuming, as above, that
bii = G(Ki;Kj), with @G
@Ki < 0 and @G
@Kj > 0, and that G(Ki;Kj) = G for Ki = Kj. It is
straightforward to show that, as for the case where ¯rms compete in prices, the more respon-
sive are customers to ¯rms' concerns for their employees, the bigger will be the incentive for
¯rms to take into account stakeholders. Therefore, for @G
@Ki su±ciently large,
@b ¦i
@Ki
¯
¯
¯
Ki=0
> 0,
and choosing a positive Ki will be optimal, thus con¯rming the results from Section 4.2.
277 Concluding Remarks
Most of the literature on corporate governance is concerned with ensuring that the ¯rm is
operated in the interests of shareholders. However, in many countries ¯rms are not only
concerned with shareholders but also other stakeholders such as employees and suppliers.
In this paper we have developed a model of stakeholder capitalism and have shown that
both ¯rms and stakeholders can be made better o® if ¯rms adopt a concern for stakeholders.
However, one result of this change is that prices can be higher so consumers may be worse
o®.
In a country such as Germany, concern for employees is embedded into the structure of
corporations through codetermination. This mandates worker representation on the super-
visory boards of large corporations. Even when such concern is not mandated by law, we
show that there exist circumstances where ¯rms will voluntarily want to embed concern for
stakeholders in their organizational structures since this increases their value compared to
just focusing on shareholders. One way of doing this is to give managers some latitude since
as employees of the ¯rm their basic incentives are somewhat aligned with the workers and
other stakeholders. Even in other circumstances where ¯rm value is not directly increased
in this way, ¯rms may voluntarily adopt concern for stakeholders if consumers prefer to do
business with such ¯rms. Consistent with our model, there is recent evidence that employee
representation on supervisory boards increases ¯rm e±ciency and market value (Fauver and
Fuerst, 2006). An open question, however, is whether the pricing policies of ¯rms di®er
systematically as a function of their governance structure, as predicted here, or whether the
higher value accruing to ¯rms with employee representation stems from other sources.
An important issue in the context of globalization concerns the e®ect of entry by stakeholder-
oriented ¯rms into shareholder-oriented societies and vice-versa. We show that all incumbent
¯rms whether they are stakeholder- or shareholder-oriented prefer a stakeholder ¯rm to en-
ter rather than a shareholder ¯rm. This raises a clear political economy perspective on ¯rm
governance, in that countries that are focused on a broader set of stakeholders are more
28likely to resist the entry of shareholder-oriented ¯rms. This resistance can be either through
direct opposition by incumbent ¯rms, or through government policies aimed at protecting
domestic ¯rms. Studying the broader implications of this perspective is an interesting avenue
for future research.
The model we have used for the product market is clearly a very simple one. Many other
features could be added. The point of using a simple model was to illustrate that concern
for stakeholders can lead shareholders to be better o®. In fact they may voluntarily choose
to adopt a concern for stakeholders. These results should hold in more general models of the
product market.
We have treated shareholders, stakeholders, and consumers as di®erent groups. In prac-
tice, of course, there is a large overlap between them. For example, workers are also con-
sumers. One issue is whether concern for stakeholders can be welfare improving compared
to ¯rms focusing on shareholders alone. Given that there are deadweight costs and rents this
is a possibility. If so, how broad are these circumstances? We leave these important issues
for future research.
29A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Corollary 1: Recall the FOC for pro¯t maximization, equation (3):
@¦i
@pi1
=
@E[¼i1]
@pi1
+ f(pi1 ¡ c)
¡
(1 ¡ F(pj1 ¡ c))¼
M
2 + F(pj1 ¡ c)¼
D
2
¢
= 0:
Denote p0
i1 = b pi1(¾0
i) as the value of the ¯rst period price that satis¯es this expression
with equality for a given variance ¾0
i, and note that trivially p0
i1 > c. Since the second
term, f(p0
i1 ¡ c)
¡
(1 ¡ F(b pj1 ¡ c))¼M
2 + F(b pj1 ¡ c)¼D
2
¢
, is strictly positive whenever f(p0
i1 ¡
c) > 0, this implies that, at equilibrium,
@E[¼i1]
@pi1 < 0. Fix p0
i1 > c, and let the variance
¾i ! 0. We have that lim¾i!0 f(p0
i1 ¡ c) = 0. Therefore, there is always a value e ¾i such
that, for any ¾1
i < e ¾i · ¾2
i, f(p0
i1 ¡ cj¾1
i)
¡
(1 ¡ F(b pj1 ¡ c))¼M
2 + F(b pj1 ¡ c)¼D
2
¢
< f(p0
i1 ¡
cj¾2
i)
¡
(1 ¡ F(b pj1 ¡ c))¼M
2 + F(b pj1 ¡ c)¼D
2
¢
.
Consider now a value of the shock variance ¾i < e ¾i. Given the ¯xed value p0
i1,
@¦i
@pi1
¯
¯
¯
¯
pi1=p0
i1
=
@E[¼i1]
@pi1
¯
¯
¯
¯
pi1=p0
i1
+ f(p
0
i1 ¡ cj¾i)
¡
(1 ¡ F(b pj1 ¡ c))¼
M
2 + F(b pj1 ¡ c)¼
D
2
¢
< 0:
To restore equilibrium, the ¯rst period price pi1 must fall. To see this note that since
@2E[¼i1]=@2pi1 < 0; a fall in pi1 increases @E[¼i1]=@pi1 (makes it less negative). Also since
the density function of ²i is non-increasing in the absolute value of ²i and p0
i1 ¡ c > 0; a
reduction in p0
i1 would increase f(p0
i1 ¡ c). Thus, for ¾i < e ¾i, the equilibrium price b pi1(¾i)
falls as ¾i decreases and converges to the single-period equilibrium price e pi as ¾i ! 0. This
establishes that there must exist some threshold ¾i such that b pi1 < pM
i for ¾i < ¾i. ¤
Proof of Corollary 2: As Ki ! 0, Proposition 1 establishes that the equilibrium ¯rst
period price, b pi1(Ki), remains higher than the single period equilibrium price, e pi. Moreover,
given our maintained assumption that ¾i < ¾i; Corollary 1 establishes that, as Ki ! 0,
b pi1(K) is lower than the joint pro¯t maximization price pM
i , and is increasing in Ki. From
the ¯rst order condition (5) for pro¯t maximization, however, it is also clear that, as Ki ! 1,
30the equilibrium price b pi1(Ki) rises until demand for ¯rm i converges to 0, so that E[¼i1] ! 0.
Therefore, there must be some Ki such that E[¼i1] is higher for Ki < Ki and lower for
Ki > Ki. ¤
Proof of Proposition 8: The two ¯rst order conditions for the stakeholder ¯rm i and the
shareholder ¯rm j are
@E[¼i1]
@pi1
+ f(pi1 ¡ c)
¡
Ki + (1 ¡ F(pj1 ¡ c))¼
M
2 + F(pj1 ¡ c)¼
D
2
¢
= 0 (9)
and
@E[¼j1]
@pj1
+ f(pj1 ¡ c)
¡
(1 ¡ F(pi1 ¡ c))¼
M
2 + F(pi1 ¡ c)¼
D
2
¢
= 0: (10)
Note ¯rst that the ¯rst order condition in equation (9) implies a higher price than that in
(10) due to the term f(pi1 ¡ c)Ki. More generally, we observe that
@2¦i
@Ki@pi1
=
@2E[¼i1]
@Ki@pi1
+ f(pi1 ¡ c) > 0:
Coupled with the assumption that prices are strategic complements, we can apply the re-
sults from Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1994) to show that prices must be higher when
the stakeholder ¯rm competes with another stakeholder ¯rm than when it competes with a
shareholder ¯rm, so that b pi1jKj>0 > b pi1jKj=0, as in the proposition. ¤
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Figure 1:  Whose Company Is It?
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